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VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION AS A STRATEGY FOR PEACE 
By Frederick C. Cuny*
There are three solutions to refugee crises, assimilation of 
the refugees into the country of asylum, resettlement to a third 
country and voluntary repatriation. Of the three, voluntary 
repatriation is considered the preferable solution.
In current practice, efforts to achieve a voluntary 
repatriation, at least when assisted by the United Nations, must 
wait until the conflict, or conditions that caused the refugees 
to flee, is resolved. The United Nations office responsible for 
assisting voluntary repatriation, the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees, requires that a tripartite agreement between the 
country of origin, the country of asylum and the High 
Commissioner be concluded before the U.N. can assist the 
refugees to return. Because the High Commissioner is an officer 
of the United Nations, which is an international organization, 
he must deal through governments. This means that the 
government of the country of origin must agree to the 
repatriation as well as verification that the refugees are well 
treated after their return. Otherwise, the High Commissioner 
cannot provide assistance or aid the refugees in any way.
The reality of the situation, especially in Africa limits 
HCR’s participation. Often the civil wars that generate 
refugees evolve into long-term, low-intensity conflicts lasting 
for years, even decades. Often insurgent forces control much of 
the countryside, with several maintaining not only military 
control, but effective civil administration in their areas. In 
these circumstances, it is often relatively safe for refugees to 
repatriate and, given even limited assistance, many might choose 
to do so, especially if it becomes clear that they do not have 
other options for ending their refugee status. However, because 
the^United Nations cannot deal with insurgent movements (known 
as non-recognized entities' ) the principal source of assistance 
to those wishing to repatriate is closed.
Refugees languishing on a border constitute a major 
impediment to peace. Not only do they generally support the 
insurgent movements back in their homelands, they often become 
bases for guerrillas and sometimes provoke military retaliation 
into the country of asylum. For the host countries, the cost of 
maintaining refugees can be high. In the poorer countries, this 
serves to penalize economic development directly by diverting 
cash to support the refugees and, indirectly, by forcing the 
governments to increase their military budgets to prevent 
punative incursions or retaliation from their neighbors.
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Given this state of affairs, of a long-term, unresolved 
refugee situations, is it not time to consider voluntary 
repatriation in a new light? Is it necessary that international 
organizations should always take a passive approach in this 
field? Are there not situations where we should actively 
promote the return of refugees even during conflicts? And most 
importantly, are there ways in which supporting voluntary 
repatriation of refugees can reduce international confrontations 
along tense borders, secure or expand areas of peace and 
stability in the countries where they repatriate and possibly 
lead to talks between parties that could provide the basis for 
discussions that would resolve basic issues of a conflict.
The record of spontaneous repatriation shows that refugees 
are relatively safe, both during their journey and once they 
have reestablished their lives in their home country. In 1985, 
approximately 54,000 refugees left eastern Sudan and returned to 
the Tigray Province of Ethiopia at the height of the drought and 
famine, and during a period of stepped-up military activity.
The return was aided by REST, the Relief Society of Tigray and 
"covered" by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). 
Despite widespread fears that many would die enroute, either 
from starvation or from Ethiopian bombing, it appears that most 
made it in good health and have done well since their return.
In fact, the following year, an additional 90,000 refugees were 
encouraged to repatriate. The UNHCR was unable to assist the 
returnees in this repatriation (in fact, both UNHCR and the U.S. 
Government actively opposed the return) and only limited 
assistance was made available, principally from the Sudanese 
Government. While the international assistance agencies thought 
that they knew better than the refugees what the risks were, the 
refugees were determined to make the journey anyway. The lesson 
here is that generally the refugees know best. It is they who 
must evaluate the risks and make the choice. In most cases, 
especially where refugee camps are located adjacent to the 
border, they will have better lines of communication back to 
their homelands and can more effectively evaluate whether they 
can return safely.
Everyone agrees that refugees have the "right to return". 
International law as well as the Universal Declaration of the 
Rights of Man, reaffirm this principle. Yet, do we not also 
have an obligation to help people voluntarily repatriate, if the 
choice is made of their own free will. To provide assistance if 
they remain refugees but not to provide assistance if they wish 
to return home, is not only counterproductive, in real terms it 
is also denying people the right granted them under inter­
national law. *
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The record shows that most repatriations are spontaneous and 
unaided. In a report by the UNHCR*, it was noted that upwards 
of ten times the number of officially assisted voluntary 
repatriations occur spontaneously and unassisted.
The mere act of going home may serve to promote a reduction 
of conflict and promote peace. Recently in El Salvador, 
thousands of refugees living in Honduras began spontaneously 
returning to their homes in conflict zones. In some areas, 
reoccupation of sites was so extensive that the Salvadoran 
Government was forced to reduce the number of aerial bombing 
sorties by up to 30% in order to keep from killing civilians.
In some areas, the returnees have warned both sides that their 
area is to be considered a hands-off, no-conflict zone.*
Taking a more active stance and encouraging spontaneous 
repatriation could conceivably provide entrees for peace talks. 
The return of the Tigrayan refugees mentioned earlier received 
great publicity when it was clear that the refugees would be 
returning even without official assistance. Many governments 
quietly urged the Ethiopian Government not to bomb the columns 
of returning refugees and pointed out that if large numbers of 
innocent civilians were killed, it could hurt the relief efforts 
underway to fight the famine in other parts of the country. Had 
the return been coordinated with an intensive campaign of 
further peace initiatives during the lull in the bombing, it 
might have been possible to establish the beginnings of 
meaningful peace talks between the two factions.
Unassisted, spontaneous repatriation often creates 
conditions that lead to official voluntary repatriation. Once 
large numbers of refugees begin moving, governments are often 
faced with fait accompli and find it in their best interest to 
take the lead in the matter, modify their terms and enter into 
tripartite agreeements with HCR.
Assisting spontaneous returnees, also offers avenues which 
could reduce conflicts and create zones of stability.
Currently, for example, small groups of Guatemalans are 
beginning to repatriate quietly to their country from Mexico. 
Many of the refugees in Mexico fled because others in their 
villages were fleeing, not because of direct death threats 
against them. Many younger people who were pre-teenagers when 
they left the country are now in their late teens and could be 
joining the work force back in Guatemala were an aided 
repatriation to occur. If international agencies working in 
Guatemala were to identify areas where the returnees could be 
settled peacefully, and provide development assistance, *
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conflict-free zones could conceivably be created and "protected" 
by encouraging a large number of agencies to work in the area 
and serve as observers. There is some evidence to show that 
even death squads are reluctant to carry out their murderous 
activities in the presence of foreign humanitarian agencies. 
Since the new democratic government of President Vinicio Cerezo 
has welcomed the return of refugees and linked it to amnesty for 
all parties, a program that actively tests this concept should 
be tried. By increasing the conflict-free zones and promoting 
development within them, the international community is directly 
supporting the attempts of the new Government of Guatemala to 
firmly establish domacracy and non-violent control throughout 
the country.
This is not to say that the obstacles to repatriation are 
not great and that the risks are not high. Furthermore, it must 
be stressed that all repatriations must be voluntary, and not 
forced, either at gunpoint or by cutting refugees rations to a 
point where it would be better healthwise for them to return. 
However, given the fact that spontaneous repatriation is far 
greater than repatriation under HCR guidelines is an indicator 
that something is amiss in the international relief system. 
Perhaps what we need is not an agency that deals with 
governments, but an agency that deals with people.
